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THE ILLINOIS LAW REVISION COMMISSION
Harry G. Fins*
The value of a modern, efficient system of statutory law cannot
be overestimated. Absent the continuous updating of the statutes,
and the repeal or amendment of deadwood provisions, an already
complex body of law may become needlessly unwieldy and confus-
ing. Illinois is one of a number of states that have recognized the
need for creating a commission whose purpose is to monitor and
revise the statutes. In this article, Mr. Fins examines the ac-
complishments of the Illinois Law Revision Commission, whose
work benefits the legal community as well as the public in general.
BACKGROUND 1961-1975
The rapid growth of legislation without the commensurate effort to repeal
or eliminate outdated or otherwise unnecessary laws has resulted in a steady
accumulation of statutory law in Illinois. Included in this voluminous body of
statutory law were archaic statutes that may have been appropriate when
first enacted, but which have no function in today's society.' It is likely
that there were numerous laws which were unknown to the public at large,
to lawyers versed in Illinois law, and even to the public officials charged
with their enforcement. 2
The state legislature has not been completely oblivious to the problem of
obsolete statutes cluttering the statute books. On several occasions the
Illinois General Assembly has passed legislation to alleviate the situation. In
response to the changes necessitated by the 1962 Judicial Article to the
Illinois Constitution, 3 the Illinois General Assembly enacted a total of 633
implementation bills during the period of 1963 through 1969.4 Over 100
* Ph.B., J.D., DePaul University; author of numerous books and treatises on Illinois and
federal practice and procedure, a contributor of articles to various law reviews and legal publi-
cations, draftsman of numerous bills to coordinate Illinois statutes with constitutional provisions
and Supreme Court Rules, counsel for the Illinois Law Revision Commission, and editorial
consultant to the West Publishing Company on the organization of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
1. See notes 26-39 and accompanying text infra.
2. See Fins, The Illinois Statute Book-A Dangerous Tool for the Bench and Bar, 57 CHI.
B. REc. 144 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fins, 57 CHI. B. REc.].
3. ILL. CONST. art. VI (1962) (current version in ILL. CONST. art. VI (1970)).
4. For background information on the need for the coordination of the Illinois statutes with
the judicial article of 1962, see Fins, Analysis of Illinois Judicial Article of 1961 and Its Legisla-
tive and Judicial Implements, 11 DEPAUL L. REv. 185 (1962); Fins, Legislative Amendments
Needed in 1965 to Coordinate Illinois Statutes with the New Judicial Article, 3 ILL. INST.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1965); Fins, Guide to Illinois Revised Statutes 1965-Need for
Coordination with New Judicial Article, 4 ILL. INST. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 51 (1966);
Fins, Need for Completion of Illinois Judicial Article Implementation Program in Legislative
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additional bills were enacted in 1971 to coordinate the revised statutes with
the Illinois Constitution of 1970.5
Recognizing the serious need for a well-coordinated, intensive effort to
effectuate thorough and continuous updating of the revised statutes, in 1975
the legislature created the Law Revision Commission 6 (Commission). The
Commission's legislatively prescribed function was to make a thorough study
of Illinois statutory law and determine which laws were obsolete and should,
therefore, be repealed. 7 The Commission presented the findings of its in-
vestigations to the Illinois General Assembly along with recommended re-
medies. The Legislature responded favorably to the Commission's recom-
mendations and effectuated some reforms.
The result of the Commission's activities has been impressive. In the four
years since its inception, the Commission has been the driving force behind
sweeping and important revisions in the Illinois Revised Statutes. This arti-
Session of 1969, 6 ILL. INST. CONTINUING LEGAL EDuc. 155 (1968); Fins, Need for Coordina-
tion of Illinois Statutes with Unified Trial Court Under the Judicial Article, 3 J. MAR. J. PRAC.
& PROC. 17 (1969).
5. See generally Fins, Need for Coordination of Illinois Statutes with New Constitution and
Supreme Court Rules, Effective July 1, 1971, 5 J. MAR. J. PiAC. & PROC. 1 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Fins, 5 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.].
6. Act of Aug. 29, 1975, P.A. 79-662, 1975 I11. Laws 2076 (repealed 1977). The general
assembly particularized the following reasons for creating the Law Revision Commission:
WHEREAS, the promiscuous spawning of legislation without any corresponding
effort to repeal archaic, outmoded and unnecessary laws has caused a steady increase
in the bulk of the statutory law of Illinois, until the Illinois Revised Statutes now
consist of three inordinately thick volumes of text plus a one-volume index; and
WHEREAS, included within this formidable body of statutory law are many
enactments which may have served a useful purpose at one time but which bear
little or no relevance to the conditions of life in the last part of the twentieth cen-
tury; and
WHEREAS, it seems highly likely that among the Illinois Statutes are many laws
the existence of which is unknown not only to members of the general public but
even to the officers who are charged with their enforcement.
Id. (preamble).
Several other states have also enacted legislation to create similar commissions. The New
York Law Revision Commission was created in 1934 and is a permanent agency. N.Y. LEGIS.
LAW § 70 (McKinney 1952). The California Law Revision Commission was created in 1953 and
also is a permanent agency. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 10300-08 (West 1966). The Michigan Law
Revision Commission was created in 1965 and also is a permanent agency. MiCH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 4.322 (1966). The Florida Law Revision Council was created in 1967 and is a permanent
agency. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 13.90 (West 1967). The Connecticut Law Revision Commission was
created in 1974, and also is a permanent agency. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-85 to -88 (West
Supp. 1980).
The statutes creating the New York, California, Michigan, Florida, and Connecticut agencies
state, in almost verbatim language, the objectives to be as follows: (1) to examine the common
law and statutes of the state and judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and
anachronisms in the law and recommending needed reforms, and (2) to propose, from time to
time, such changes in the law as it deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and
inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law of this state into harmony with modern conditions.
7. See Act of Aug. 29, 1975, P.A. 79-662, §§ 2-3, 1975 I11. Laws 2077.
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cle examines chronologically these legislative improvements since the Com-
mission's organization.
THE COMMISSION'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1976
During its first year of operation the Law Revision Commission played an
important role in the passage of ten bills that amended 335 statutes. 8 The
primary objective of these bills was to coordinate the statutes with Illinois'
constitutional provisions, 9 the Supreme Court Rules, 10 and the Civil Prac-
tice Act. 1" The bulk of the revisions fall into two major categories: (a) the
deletion of references to archaic terminology and (b) the repeal of appellate
provisions that had been superseded by the Supreme Court Rules.
Archaic Terminology
Perhaps the most significant modernization in Illinois legal terminology
came as a result of the adoption of the Judicial Article of 1962,12 which
provided that Illinois circuit courts shall have "original jurisdiction of all jus-
ticiable matters." 13  The many references to "courts of law" and "courts of
chancery" were systematically eliminated to align the language of the stat-
8. These bills became the Act of Aug. 2, 1976, P.A. 79-1335, 1976 I11. Laws 625, and the
Acts of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1358 to -1366, 1976 111. Laws 713-1096. It is of interest to observe
that prior to the effective date of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, this project would have
required the drafting of 335 separate bills. Section 8(d) of article IV of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, however, makes possible the amendment of a number of statutes by one bill, if the
purpose of the change is (1) codification, (2) revision, or (3) rearrangement of laws. ILL. CONST.
art. IV, § 8(d) (1970). This constitutional provision made it possible to combine the amendment
of 335 different statutes into these 10 bills.
For the background and reasons for the statutory changes involved, see Fins, 5 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PRoc., supra note 5, and Fins, 57 CHi. B. REC., supra note 2, at 144-52.
9. Particularly, the bills were designed to coordinate the revised statutes with changes
brought about by the Judicial Articles of 1962 and 1970. See ILL. CONST. art. VI (1970).
10. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A (1977).
11. Id. ch. 110.
12. ILL. CONST. art. VI (1962) (incorporated as ILL. CONST. art. VI (1970)).
13. Id. § 9. Under § 9 of the Judicial Article of 1962, which has been incorporated in the
1970 Judicial Article, the standard for determining the presence or absence of circuit court
jurisdiction is no longer whether the case falls within the historical categories of law or equity or
whether it is covered by statute; the test is now simply whether the matter is "justiciable." See
People v. Gilmore, 63 I11. 2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456 (1976), The court in Gilmore stated: "The
jurisdiction of the circuit courts in these cases was not 'conferred' by the information or indict-
ment; jurisdiction was conferred by the provisions of section 9 of article VI of the Constitution,
which provides that circuit courts have 'original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.' " Id. at
25, 344 N.E.2d at 358. See also People v. Valdez, 79 I11. 2d 74, 402 N.E.2d 187 (1980). Valdez
pointed out the sharp distinction between the Illinois Constitutions of 1870 and 1970. The court
specifically held that the jurisdiction of the circuit courts is not derived from statute and that
§ 9 of article VI of the 1970 Constitution, which gives the circuit courts "original jurisdiction of
all justiciable matters," is the source of their jurisdictional powers. Id. at 85, 402 N.E.2d at 193.
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utes with the unified circuit court system.14  Additional terminology ren-
dered obsolete by the Judicial Article of the Illinois Constitution included
"Superior Court of Cook County," "county court," "justice of the peace,"
"constable," and "master-in-chancery." 15
The Commission found it necessary to make other adjustments in the lan-
guage of the statutes. The designation of the final order in equitable pro-
ceedings, formerly "decree," was changed to "judgment." 16 This coordi-
nated the statutes with the Illinois Constitution and Supreme Court Rules,
wherein the term judgment is the designation for final orders in all civil
cases. Similarly, to coordinate statutes pertaining to adversary civil proceed-
ings with the uniform nomenclature of the Civil Practice Act, the Commis-
sion substituted the term "complaint" for the terms "petition" and "informa-
tion." 1 7  Also, the terms "petitioner" and "respondent" were replaced by
"plaintiff" and "defendant.""1 Finally, the Commission pinpointed obsolete
words and phrases that reflected remnants of pre-1934 legal practice, before
the Civil Practice Act became effective. Glaring examples of such anach-
ronisms embodied in the statutes included "demurrer," "nihil dicit," and
"riens per descent. ' 19
14. See public acts cited at note 8 supra. The Illinois Appellate Court had enunciated
numerous times since the Judicial Article of 1962 went into effect on January 1, 1964, the
important changes in the basic composition of the circuit courts. See City of Chicago v. Nielsen,
38 I11. App. 3d 941, 349 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1976) (the new constitution abolished the courts
of limited jurisdiction and consolidated all law and chancery powers in one unified circuit court
system); Stevens v. Protectoseal Co., 27 111. App. 3d 724, 327 N.E.2d 427 (lst Dist. 1975) (the
purpose of § 9 was to create a single integrated trial court structure); Haas v. Pick Gal-
leries, Inc., 12 111. App. 3d 865, 299 N.E.2d 93 (1st Dist. 1973) (unlike the previous inferior
courts which had only limited jurisdiction, the present circuit court has unlimited and original
jurisdiction); In re Estate of Marcucci, 5 II1. App. 3d 484, 285 N.E.2d 141 (1st Dist. 1972) (the
new judicial system abolished all distinctions between the courts of law and equity and con-
ferred all judicial power on circuit courts without regard to specialized functions of a division
within the court); Douglas v. Papierz, 121 III. App. 2d 242, 257 N.E.2d 570 (1st Dist. 1970)
(jurisdictional differences between equity and law courts have been abolished, and today, Il-
linois circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases brought before them). See also Lopin
v. Cullerton, 46 I11. App. 3d 378, 361 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1977) (in Illinois, because jurisdiction
is constitutional, and is vested in a unified trial court, the failure of the parties, in a "justiciable
matter', to comply with the provisions of a statute, may give rise to questions concerning proce-
dure but not to questions concerning jurisdiction). For a collection of cases on this matter, see
Fins, Circuit Court Jurisdiction Under Illinois Constitution, Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 9 Judicial
Administration Newsletter No. 12 (June 1979).
15. See generally Fins, Re-Examination of Jurisdiction' in Light of New Illinois Judicial
Article, 53 ILL. B.J. 8 (1964).
16. Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1358, 1976 I11. Laws 713; Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-
1363, 1976 II1. Laws 973; Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1364, 1976 Ill. Laws 1013.
17. Section 32 of the Civil Practice Act provides that "[t]he first pleading by the plaintiff
shall be designated a complaint. The first pleading by the defendant shall be designated an
answer." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 32 (1977).
18. In § 21(1) of the Civil Practice Act, it is stated that "[t]he party commencing an
action shall be called the plaintiff. The adverse party shall be called the defendant." Id. § 21(1).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 13 (1975) (repealed by Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1365, §
27, 1976 II1. Laws 1066); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 87, § 2 (1975) (amended by Act of Aug. 6, 1976,
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Superseded Appellate Provisions
In addition to the deletion of outmoded terminology, the Commission
eliminated appellate provisions that were superseded by the Supreme Court
Rules. 20 This was necessary as a result of the landmark Illinois Supreme
Court decision of People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones,2 1 which held a statutory
appellate provision "invalid" because "it exceeded the authority granted to
the General Assembly by the constitution, [as] the constitution has placed
responsibility for rules governing appeal in the Supreme Court, and not in
the General Assembly."2 2  This important decision operated as an impetus
for the re-examination of all Illinois statutes containing appellate provisions,
with the object of retaining the desirable practices by converting them into
court rules and by repealing or eliminating all the undesirable ones. This
project resulted in a substantial revision of appellate rules, with the express
proscription that "[tihe rules on appeals supersede statutory provisions in-
consistent with the rules and govern all appeals."
23
THE COMMISSION'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1977
In 1977 the Law Revision Commission made further inroads into the for-
midable task of revising the Illinois statutes. Besides continuing the neces-
sary updating of statutory terminology begun in the previous year, the
Commission also turned its attention to repealing obsolete statutes that
had remained on the books long after serving any useful purpose. 24  Addi-
tionally, in accordance with the growing recognition of the need to curtail
sex-based discrimination, the Commission took active steps to eliminate
gender-biased terminology from the statutes.2 5
Obsolete Statutes
A modern body of statutory law should not be encumbered by deadwood
provisions. Without an organized effort to revise the statutes, certain acts
will technically remain in effect despite the fact that they no longer possess
any meaning or usefulness. Three noteworthy examples of acts repealed
P.A. 79-1358, § 24, 1976 I11. Laws 747; reenacted as ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 87, § 2 (1977)). See
text accompanying notes 199-240 infra for more examples of archaic terms and their definitions.
20. See Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1359 to -1362, 1976 I11. Laws 770-973; Act of Aug 6,
1976, P.A. 79-1365, 1976 I11. Laws 1034.
21. 40 I11. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968) (appeal from final order). See also People v. Taylor,
50 I11. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1972) (appeal from interlocutory order).
22. People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 I11. 2d 62, 66, 237 N.E.2d 495, 500 (1968). In the
recent case of In re Marriage of Lentz, __ Ill. 2d __, 403 N.E.2d 1036, 1037, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that "[a]ny legislative enactment in conflict with the rules of this court
governing appeals [is] invalid."
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 1 (1977).
24. See notes 26-39 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text infra.
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upon recommendations of the Commission are the Amendments and Jeofails
Act, 26 the Drovers Act, 27 and the Foundlings Act. 28
First enacted in 1874, the Amendments and Jeofails Act was designed to
alleviate the rigors of common law pleading and writ of error practice that
prevailed at that time. 29 Since then, both of these procedural encum-
brances have been abolished. Common law pleading was superseded by the
Illinois Civil Practice Act and writ of error practice was replaced by the
Supreme Court Rules. 30 Consequently, the Amendment and Jeofails Act
finally was repealed in 1977, 31 more than forty years after it had become
totally obsolete because of the adoption of liberalized pleading in Illinois.
The Drover's Act provides a humorous example of a law that had outlived
its usefulness in modern society. This Act, dating back to 1872, provided
penalties for anyone guilty of riding or driving faster than a walk's-pace
through a herd of livestock. 32 Surprisingly, the legislature never formally
repealed this Act, even though portions of it were amended in 1941. It was
not until 1977 that this statutory non sequitur was severed from the Illinois
statute books. 33
The third obsolete Act that was repealed at the behest of the Commis-
sion was the Foundlings Act. 34 Enacted in 1872, the Foundlings Act was
never amended. It provided essentially a "self-help" adoption remedy3 5 in
favor of charitable institutions after mothers had abandoned their unwanted
children. The self-help remedy provided by the Act was clearly contrary to
the public policy of the State of Illinois, which requires adoption to be for-
26. Id. ch. 7 (1975) (repealed by Act of Sept. 16, 1977, P.A. 80-742, 1977 Ill. Laws 2211).
27. Id. ch. 44 (1975) (repealed by Act of Sept. 16, 1977, P.A. 80-739, 1977 I11. Laws 2209).
28. Id. ch. 58 (1975) (repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A. 80-661, 1977 I11. Laws 2016).
29. Id. ch. 7 (1975) (repealed by Act of Sept. 16, 1977, P.A. 80-742, 1977 I11. Laws 2211).
The Illinois Appellate Court has elaborated on the purposes behind the Amendment and Jeofails
Act. See Page v. W.F. Hallam & Co., 212 I11. App. 462 (1919) (the purpose of this Act is to
liberalize trial practice and render the courts more efficient by allowing amendments to plead-
ings in pending lawsuits in every case where the party seeking such privileges is able to show
he is without culpable negligence).
30. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 21, 26, 39, 46, 54, (1975) (current version at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110 (1977)); id. ch. 110A §§ 329, 362, 366, 612, 615 (1975) (current version at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 10A (1977)).
31. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 44, § § 5, 6 (1975) (repealed by Act of Sept. 16, 1977, P.A. 80-739,
1977 II1. Laws 2209). "Any person ... who shall ride or drive faster than a walk, into or
through a herd of horses, or other stock, which are being herded or driven, shall .... pay a
fine . . . for each offense . I..." Id. § 5.
33. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 58 (1975) (repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A. 80-661, 1977 I11.
Laws 2016).
35. Id. The statute provided that when any parent willfully leaves a child at any charitable
institution, the child is considered abandoned without the usual judicial determination of aban-
donment so that the parent loses all rights and interests in the child. Id. §§ 1, 2.
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malized through judicial proceedings.36 For example, the Adoption Act 37
and the Juvenile Court Act 3 8 recognize the competing interests present in
adoptions. Both Acts provide procedural safeguards for preserving the rights
of all interested parties, as well as criteria for determining the necessity of
acquiring parental consent before adoption. The self-help remedy of the
Foundlings Act effectively circumvented these legislative requirements, al-
though the Act was probably unconstitutional as well. 39  The revocation of
this Act removed an unnecessary and confusing element from modern adop-
tion law.
Archaic or Outmoded Terminology
In 1977, the Commission continued its efforts to purge the revised stat-
utes of archaic or outmoded terminology. Efforts in this respect were di-
rected at three major problems: 1) the elimination of references to common
law terminology, pertaining to conveyances of real property, 2) the elimina-
tion of references to chattel mortgages, and 3) the continued deletion of
references to the specialized court system in effect before the Judicial Article
of the constitution vested original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters in the
circuit courts. 40
Contemporary lawyers do not-and society as a whole does not-speak of
"livery of seizin' 4 1 or about participation in a "feoffment." 4 2  Until 1977,
however, such terms were embodied in the Illinois Revised Statutes. Because
36. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1501-1529 (1977).
37. Id.
38. Id. ch. 37, §§ 701-708.
39. The Foundlings Act was obviously unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(a) It did not provide for notice to parents as required by Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), and People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Child Home, 52 I11. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291
(1972). See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (held that failure to serve a father in
an adoption proceeding and merely giving the father an opportunity to vacate a judgment for
the adoption of his child violated due process of law).
(b) It allowed "self-help" without a court proceeding in apparent violation of Fuentes v. She-
vin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
(c) It was special legislation in violation of § 13 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution of
1970, which provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a
general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable
shall be a matter for judicial determination." ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (1970).
40. See notes 13 & 14 supra.
41. "Livery of seizin" is "[tihe appropriate ceremony at [English] common law, for transfer-
ring the corporeal possession of lands or tenements by a grantor to his grantee." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 843 (5th ed. 1979). The act of transferring title itself was accomplished by either
entering upon the land, if the action were in deed, or within sight of the land, if the action
were at law, and physically handing over a clod of dirt or a twig as symbolic delivery of the
whole. Id.
42. A "feoffment" is "[tihe gift of any corporeal hereditament to another, operating by
transmutation of possession, and requiring as essential to its completion, that the seizin be
passed, which might be accomplished either by investiture or by livery of seizin .... The
essential part is livery of seizin." Id. at 557.
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the Act concerning conveyances expressly provides that "livery of seizin shall
in no case be necessary for the conveyance of real property"' 43 it is totally
unnecessary to employ such outmoded nomenclature in present-day con-
veyance statutes. It is likewise unrealistic to refer to the ownership of title in
real estate as "lawful seizin, '"4 4 as such ownership has nothing to do with the
ancient ceremony of English common law. Various acts were amended,
therefore, to eliminate this anomaly.45
In another refinement of the Illinois statutes the Commission eliminated
references to chattel mortgages. 46 In 1961, the General Assembly adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code and thereby substituted the term "security
interest" for "chattel mortgage." 47  Although several statutes were amended
to reflect this change, a number of other acts had remained unaltered. Be-
cause this could easily lead to confusion, a number of acts were amended to
correct the remaining statutes that used the old terminology.
48
The third type of language revision involved eliminating references to
county courts and to the law/chancery distinction. While the Commission
had discovered and deleted many such references in 1976, 4 9 the sheer
number of outdated references necessitated further deletions in 1977.50
Elimination of Gender-Biased Terminology
In the third major category of statutory revisions wrought in 1977, the
Law Revision Commission proved itself sensitive to the growing recogni-
tion 5 1 of equality between the sexes by removing gender-biased terminology
from the Illinois statutes. Prior to 1977, Illinois statutes employed masculine
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 1 (1977).
44. See id. H 3, 5 (amended by Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A.80-660, 1977 Il. Laws 2003).
45. Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A. 80-660, 1977 II. Laws 2003.
46. "Chattel mortgage" is defined as "[a] transfer of some legal or equitable right in personal
property or creation of a lien thereon as security for payment of money or performance of some
other act, subject to defeasance on performance of the conditions. ... BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 215 (5th ed. 1979).
47. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 1-201(37), 9-102, 10-102 (1977).
48. Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A. 80-662, 1977 Il. Laws 2017.
49. See notes 13, 14, and accompanying text supra.
50. Besides eliminating the term "county court," some duties of the former county judges
and county courts were reposed in the circuit courts and some of the non-judicial duties were
removed from the court system and placed in the county boards. This was accomplished by Act
of Sept. 16, 1977, P.A. 80-704, 1977 Ill. Laws 2131; Act of Sept. 12, 1977, P.A. 80-585, 1977
Ill. Laws 1852; Act of Sept. 8, 1977, P.A. 80-571, 1977 Ill. Laws 1813; Act of Sept. 8, 1977,
P.A. 80-551 to -555, 1977 II. Laws 1739-44; Act of Sept. 3, 1977, P.A. 80-471, 1977 Il1. Laws
1506.
51. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977), vacating and remanding Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Craig v. Boern, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); People v. Ellis, 57 I11. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974); Phelps v. Bing, 58 II1. 2d 32, 316
N.E.2d 775 (1974).
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pronouns exclusively, even though the Illinois Constitution contains an equal
rights provision. 52
Statutes were amended to provide equal substantive rights where, for-
merly, such rights were reserved to members of one sex. Examples of this
type of change are the addition of "widower" to "widow" in some statutes
and the elimination of both terms in lieu of "surviving spouse" in other
acts. 53 Another important change was the substitution of "marriage" for
"coverture," to remove the possible stigma that a married woman was in a
state of subjugation under her husband's domination. 54 Unmistakably,
these changes permit persons to obtain benefits that previously may have
been unavailable to them solely because of their sex. Other amendments
promoted by the Commission simply added the feminine pronoun wherever
a masculine existed, or changed "male" and "female" designations to "per-
son."55 In most cases, this type of syntactic change had little effect on the
underlying substantive rights of the sexes.
THE COMMISSION'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1978
The Illinois legal system inherited from common law procedure the legal
tool known as a "writ." 5 6  The object of a writ is to notify the person to
whom it is directed of the contents of a court order. Writs originated during
a time when the reproduction of documents entailed the tedious task of
copying documents longhand. The clerk of the court was delegated this func-
tion because the clerk was the official keeper of the court records. The clerk
would prepare the writ, which embodied the substance of the court order,
and present it to the sheriff for execution while the original order remained
in the court file.
Since the photostating machine has come into common use, it is a simple
task to reproduce the actual court order, which bears the genuine signature
of the judge, and serve this copy directly on the party named. Photostating
court orders and other legal documents rather than transcribing the informa-
tion longhand will save thousands of hours of clerks' time while avoiding the
52. ILL. CONSr. art. I, § 18 (1970). "The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts." Id.
53. Act of Jan. 4, 1978, P.A. 80-1154 to -1156, 1977 I11. Laws 3441-62; Act of Aug. 26, 1977,
P.A. 80-353 to -360, 1977 I11. Laws 1258-68.
54. Act of Sept. 22, 1977, P.A. 80-933, 1977 I1l. Laws 2675-2705.
55. This project was accomplished by a series of public acts, each affecting a block of stat-
utes. Act of Jan. 4, 1978, 80-1154 to -1156, 1977 Ill. Laws 3441-62; Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A.
80-656, 1977 Ill. Laws 1997; Act of Aug. 26, 1977, P.A. 80-353 to -360, 1977 I11. Laws 1258-68;
Act of Aug. 26, 1977, P.A. 80-328, 1977 II1. Laws 1212; Act of Aug. 26, 1977, P.A. 80-331 to
334, 1977 II1. Laws 1222-29; Act of Aug. 26, 1977, P.A. 80-344, 1977 II1. Laws 1244; Act of Aug.
26, 1977, P.A. 80-348, 1977 111. Laws 1249.
56. A large variety of writs were in use in Illinois prior to 1978-writs of mandamus, injunc-
tion, habeas corpus, replevin, ne exeat, execution, attachment, possession, restitution, and as-
sistance.
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errors that inevitably accompany manual transcription. It has been estimated
that this simple change, enacted by the legislature in 1978, will save the
State of Illinois between three to five million dollars annually. 57
THE COMMISSION'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1979
In 1979 the Law Revision Commission enjoyed a successful year in its
continuing quest to modernize the Illinois statutes. Although the numerous
acts sponsored by the commission affected a wide variety of laws, the statu-
tory modifications may be loosely categorized into three groupings. First, the
Commission was responsible for the repeal of obsolete or anomalous provi-
sions in the statutes. Second, bills were presented to remove procedural
uncertainties from the statutes. Finally, acts were passed for the purpose of
coordinating the statutes with other legislation, the Supreme Court Rules,
and reviewing-court decisions.
Repeal of Obsolete Provisions
The Law Revision Commission successfully sponsored sixty-five bills in
1979, which affected 213 separate acts. Many of these bills repealed sections
of acts that had been held unconstitutional during the seventy-five year
period of 1903-1978.58
Scire Facias
A good example of the Commission's progress in modernizing the Illinois
statutes is the abolition of two forms of scire facias. 5 9  One type of scire
facias proceeding existed as a means of foreclosing on a mortgage. 60 The
purpose of the second form of scire facias was to revive a judgment. 61
Scire facias to foreclose on a mortgage was a writ that issued upon default
of a mortgagor, requiring the mortgagor to show cause why the mortgage
57. See H. Res. 219, 81st G.A., 1st Sess. (1979). The above discussed innovation was
brought about by Act of' July 31, 1978, P.A. 80-1284, 1978 Il. Laws 816. The statute now
provides that when a judgment or order is entered and "signed by a judge and filed and cer-
tified by the clerk of the court, such certified judgment or order shall, in each case, constitute
the appropriate writ, and no separate writ need be issued." See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 601
(1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
58. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-261, 1979 I11. Laws 624; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-269, 1979 I11. Laws 642; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-287 to -290, 1979 II. Laws 679-82.
These statutes repealed 38 acts and sections of acts which had been held unconstitutional.
59. A writ of scire facias is a judicial writ founded upon an order or decree that required the
party named therein to show cause why the instituting party should not benefit from the court's
edict. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1208 (5th ed. 1979). The writ of scire facias was considered
tantamount to a summons. See Strauss v. Merchant's Loan & Trust Co., 119 I11. App. 588, 594
(1st Dist. 1905).
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, §§ 58-61 (1977) (as amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-286, 1979 I11. Laws 679).
61. Id. ch. 77, § 6 (as amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-268, 1979 I11. Laws 641).
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should not be foreclosed. 62  As a procedural matter, mortgage foreclosure by
scire facias was held to be an "in rem" 63 proceeding "at law" 64 that could
affect only the property described in the mortgage. The object of the pro-
ceeding was to enforce a specific lien. The ensuing judgment would only
determine the amount due on the mortgage and direct a sale of the
mortgaged premises to satisfy the judgment. 65
Since the early part of this century, the use of scire facias in Illinois to
foreclose a mortgage had become nonexistent. 66 In addition, the archaic
statutory procedure was not in harmony with certain sections of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act. 67  Recognizing that this use of scire facias was inconsist-
ent with modern real estate practice, 68 the Commission urged that the pro-
cedure be abolished and the legislature complied. 69
Scire facias also existed as a means of reviving a judgment that had be-
come unenforceable after a lapse of seven years. 70 This procedure required
a separate action, entirely apart from the action in which the original judg-
ment was entered and encumbered by the formalities of affidavits and plead-
62. The writ of scire facias was regarded as both a form of process and a pleading. See Wood
v. People, 16 111. 171, L72 (1854); People v. Lewis, 209 I11. App. 3, 5 (2d Dist. 1918).
63. See White v. Watkins, 23 111. 426, 428 (1860); State Bank v. Wilson, 9 Ill. (4 Gilm.) 57,
61 (1847).
64. See Chickering v. Failes, 26 Ill. 508, 517-18 (1861).
65. See Woodbury v. Manlove, 14 I11. 213, 216 (1852) (mortgage foreclosure by scire facias
creates no lien on the other property of the mortgagor, and the only process that can issue upon
it is a special execution against the mortgaged premises).
66. See Carey, Brabner-Smith & Sullivan, Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County: Foreclo-
sure Methods and Redemptions, 27 ILL. L. REV. 595, 612 (1933). "Foreclosure of mortgages by
scire facias was first authorized (in Illinois) by statute of January 17, 1825, and proceedings of
this nature were very common during the first half of the [nineteenth] century, but the statute
and practice thereunder have now become practically a dead letter." Id. at 612.
67. For example, § 55 of the Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 55 (1977), pro-
vides: "'Any relief which heretofore might have been obtained by scire facias may be had by
employing an ordinary civil action." Id. See also Smith v. Carlson, 8 II. 2d 74, 132 N.E.2d 513
(1956) (a scire facias proceeding and a civil action in lieu thereof are concurrent and identical
remedies).
68. Scire facias to foreclose a mortgage had its roots in the common law distinctions between
law and equity. When Illinois had a bifurcated legal system, two concurrent remedies existed to
foreclose a mortgage-a bill in chancery and scire facias at law. It is possible that the remedy at
law existed to avoid the additional costs of a master in chancery fees. Today, since circuit courts
have "original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters," see ILL. CONST. art. VI § 9 (1970), and
masters of chancery are extinct, there is no reason to retain the cumbersome scire facias rem-
edy. See also note 13 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-286, 1979 III. Laws 679 (repealed ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95, §§ 58-62 (1977)).
70. See ILL. RE'. STAT. ch. 77, § 6 (1977). Under existing Illinois law, no execution could
"issue upon any judgment after the expiration of 7 years from the time the same is rendered,
except upon the revival of the same by scire facias . " Id.
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ings. 71  Despite the enormous progress that had been made in updating
procedural law in Illinois, 72 the legislature had failed to abolish this vestige
of archaic and inefficient practice. There was no justification for employing
this repetitious and costly procedure when a petition in the original case
where the judgment was entered would serve the same purpose. To ac-
complish this goal, the Commission urged the amendment of several stat-
utes 73 to terminate the use of scire facias to revive a judgment, and the
legislature complied by abolishing this procedure in 1979.74
Abolition of Writs
In 1979 the Commission continued its efforts to abolish writs by sponsor-
ing twenty-one bills that affected twenty-four acts, completely removing
writs from the Illinois statutes and substituting certified copies of orders and
judgments. 75 The abolished writs included writs of injunction, habeas cor-
pus, replevin, execution, ne exeat, possession, restitution, and assistance. 76
71. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24(b) (1977) (amended 1979). The statute provided that:
[A]ctions to revive judgments ... by scire facias shall be commenced by affidavit
... setting forth a description of the original judgment by title of the action, date
and amount thereof, together with a statement of any partial satisfaction of such
original judgment .... [and] setting forth a written designation of the return day
for the writ.
The clerk of such court shall file such affidavit as a separate action which shall be
ancillary to the action in which the original judgment was entered. Upon the entry
of a judgment of reviver execution may be issued in the scire facias action.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. See notes 91-161 and accompanying text infra. The Illinois Practice Act of 1907, which
abolished the formalistic procedure of writ of error coram nobis, is an example of innovative
change in Illinois procedural law. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 89 (1907) (as amended by ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1934)). The 1955 revision of the Civil Practice Act firther modern-
ized procedural law by abolishing writs of coram nobis, writs of audita querela, hills of review,
and bills in the nature of bills of review. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1977).
There are also statutory provisions for the enforcement of the judgment without the necessity
of filing a new action. Examples of these are: citation proceedings under § 73 of the Civil
Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 73 (1977); proceedings under the Garnishment Act
against persons who are indebted to the judgment debtor, id. ch. 62, §§ 33-52; and the collec-
tion of support for a spouse and child under the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, id.
ch. 40, §§ 101-904.
73. The acts recommended for amendment were the Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, § 55 (1977), the judgment Act, id. ch. 77, § 6, and the Limitations Act, id. ch. 83, § 24(b).
74. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-268, 1979 Ill. Laws 641, amended § 55 of the Civil
Practice Act to read: "Scire facias abolished. Any relief which heretofore might have been ob-
tained by scire facias may be had by employing a petition filed in the case in which the original
judgment was entered, and notice shall be given in accordance with rules." Id.
75. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-281, 1979 Ill. Laws 653; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-256, 1979 IlI. Laws 613; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-253 to -254, 1979 II. Laws 611-12;
Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-239 to -251, 1979 I1. Laws 583-608; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-234 to -237, 1979 Ill. Laws 571-80.
76. See note 56 supra.
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As a result, the bill enacted in 1978 has been superseded by the 1979 legis-
lation.
Mittimus
The Commission also concentrated its efforts on abolishing another un-
necessary procedural device, the requirement of mittimus in criminal and
quasi-criminal and civil proceedings. A mittimus is simply a transcript of the
minutes of a sentence, duly certified by the clerk, 7 7 which commands the
sheriff to convey a prisoner to prison and to order the jailer safely to confine
the prisoner in accordance with the court's sentence. 78 The clerk could
certify the order and the sheriff could execute the sentence only as re-
corded. 79
The Supreme Court of Illinois found there to be no statutory requirement
for mittimus. 80 On the contrary, the court found authority for the opposite
position that a mittimus was unnecessary, because a prisoner, lawfully
sentenced, could not be released from prison merely because no mittimus
had accompanied imprisonment."' If the prisoner was safely in custody
there was no office for a mittimus to perform. 82 Therefore, because mit-
timus was unnecessary for the enforcement of a criminal sentence, or in a
quasi-criminal or civil proceeding, the Commission proposed that the re-
quirement of mittimus be expressly eliminated in cases where a signed
judgment or order would suffice. Again, the legislature complied. 83
77. United States v. Denemark, 138 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1943); Saunders v. United
States, 73 F. 782 (1st Cir. 1896).
78. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 904 (5th ed. 1979).
79. People v. Graydon, 329 I11. 398, 401, 160 N.E. 748, 750 (1928).
80. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 358 II1. 81, 192 N.E. 693 (1934). Quoting from two prior
decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court stated: "As a matter of fact there is no special require-
ment in our statute that a sheriff or other officer must be supplied with a mittimus after an
order and judgment of conviction and sentence to jail have been entered by the court." Id. at
88-89, 192 N.E. at 695-96.
81. Id. at 89, 192 N.E. at 696. "There is authority, at any rate, for the proposition that a
prisoner who has been legally and properly sentenced to prison cannot be released from prison
merely because of an imperfection in the warrant for commitment . Id.
82. In a related matter, § 4(b) of article VI of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides
that where a defendant is sentenced to death by the judgment of a circuit court, an appeal
is automatically perfected to the supreme court without any action by the defendant or coun-
sel, and Supreme Court Rule 613(a) provides for a certified copy of the order of execution
without the need for a mittimus. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, §§ 606, 613 (1977).
83. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-238, 1979 I11. Laws 582, provides that:
(a) In all cases . . .when a person is imprisoned, . . . by virtue of a judgment or
order which is signed by a judge, a copy of such judgment or order shall ...
constitute the mittimus, and no separate mittimus need be issued.
(b) Where no written judgment or order was signed by a judge, the practice hereto-
fore prevailing shall be followed.
id. § 1.
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Lawyer's Status Under the Ejectment Act
Another statutory modification recommended by the Commission in 1979
involved the status of attorneys under the Ejectment Act. 84 The Ejectment
Act provided the unique right of a defendant to stay court proceedings pend-
ing proof from the plaintiff's attorney that counsel had actual authority to use
the plaintiff's name in instituting the action. 85 No other Illinois statute has
provided a defendant with such extraordinary rights.
It was the belief of the Commission that these sections of the Ejectment
Act were unconstitutional for two reasons. First, they constituted a legisla-
tive infringement upon an attorney's right to practice law under a license
that was granted by the supreme court. Because the licensing of attorneys,
therefore, is within the exclusive dominion of the judicial branch, 86 the
legislature's intrusion into this field constituted a breach of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. 87 Second, these provisions of the Eject-
ment Act constituted unconstitutional special legislation"8 because they were
made applicable only to an action of ejectment, while other similar actions
involving real estate had no such provision. 89 The legislature responded
favorably to the Commission's recommendation and repealed the trouble-
some sections of the Act. 90
Removal of Procedural Uncertainties from the Statutes
Defendant's Motion for Judgment at the Close of
Plaintiff's Case in a Non-Jury Trial
One of the noteworthy revisions brought about by the Commission in-
volved section 64 of the Civil Practice Act. 9 1 This section provides the
standard for weighing evidence in a non-jury trial on a defendant's motion
for judgment at the close of the plaintiff's case. The section formerly had
provided, in pertinent part, simply that "the court shall weigh the evi-
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 45 (1977) (as amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-284, 1979
111. Laws 678).
85. Id. §§ 15, 16. Essentially, the defendant filed an affidavit with the court that he had
never been served with proof, in any way, of the authority of the attorney to use the name of
the plaintiff stated in the complaint. Id. § 15. Upon such application, the court entered an order
requiring the production of such authority and staying all proceedings until the necessary au-
thority was supplied. Id. § 16.
86. See In re Day, 181 I11. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899) (legislative acts interfering with the
licensing of attorneys are repugnant to the constitution).
87. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1970). "'The legislative, executive and judicial branches are
separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." Id.
88. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970). "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local
law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." Id.
89. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106, § 44 (1977) (partition); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 (1977)
(forcible entry and detainer); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47 (1977) (condemnation).
90. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-284, 1979 III. Laws 678.
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 64 (1977) (as amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-270,
1979 1t1. Laws 642).
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dence." 92  The appellate courts encountered difficulty in interpreting the
clause, and as a result there develped two opposing lines of decisions. One
line of cases 93 held that the plaintiff's evidence, along with all reasonable
inferences, were to be construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff. On the
other hand, the opposing line of cases 94 held that the trial judge must con-
sider the credibility of the witnesses and all inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.
The Illinois Supreme Court resolved the conflict in its decision of City of
Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 95 by stating that the judge in a non-jury
case had the duty to pass on the credibility of the witnesses. The supreme
court thereby clarified the role of the appellate court in reviewing a trial
court's decision granting judgment in favor of the defendant. The supreme
court noted that the rule in jury cases is that a motion for a directed verdict
should be granted only when all the evidence, "viewed in its aspect most
favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no con-
trary verdict could ever stand." 96 In contrast, when the judge is the trier of
fact, he or she must weigh all the evidence and pass on the credibility of the
witnesses. The judge should not consider evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff.97  Therefore, the supreme court ruled that the trial
court's decision should not be reversed unless it was contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. 98
In accord with the Ridgeview court's interpretation of section 64(3), the
Civil Practice Act was amended, in 1979, to require that the judge consider
the "credibility of the witnesses and the weight and quality of the evi-
dence." 9 9  This revision harmonizes section 64 with the Illinois Supreme
Court decision 100 and eliminates the confusion, previously caused by section
64, over the proper construction.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Jordan/Tamarez/Caruso Advertising, Inc. v. Parker Career Center, 10 I11.
App. 3d 247, 294 N.E.2d 59 (1st Dist. 1973); Pascal & Assoc., Inc. v. Punchinello's East, Inc.,
9 II1. App. 3d 456, 292 N.E.2d 429 (1st Dist. 1972); De Bello v. Checker Taxi Co., 8 I11. App.
3d 401, 292 N.E.2d 437 (lst Dist. 1972); Russow v. Bobola, 2 I11. App. 3d 837, 277 N.E.2d 769
(2d Dist. 1972).
94. See, e.g., Jackson v. Spivey, 26 I11. App. 3d 670, 325 N.E.2d 323 (1st Dist. 1975); Rey
v. Rey, 23 I11. App. 3d 274, 319 N.E.2d 105 (2d Dist. 1974); Drovers Nat'l Bank v. Ferrell, 14
I11. App. 3d 389, 302 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist. 1973); Hawthorn Mellody Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Rosenberg, 11 11. App. 3d 739, 297 N.E.2d 649 (1st Dist. 1973); Bochenek v. Bochenek, 5 I11.
App. 3d 65, 283 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1972).
95. 64 I11. 2d 40, 349 N.E.2d 399 (1976).
96. Id. at 57-58, 349 N.E.2d at 408, citing Pedrick v. Peoria R.R., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229
N.E.2d 504 (1967).
97. City of Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 64 II1. 2d 40, 57-58, 349 N.E.2d 399,
407-08 (1976).
98. Id.
99. See Block v. Dardanes, - I1l. App. 3d -, 404 N.E.2d 807 (1st Dist. 1980). See Act of
Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-270, § 1(3), 1979 II1. Laws 642.
100. See notes 95-99 and accompanying text supra.
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Appeal by One of Several Parties
The Commission discovered discrepancies between section 81101 of the
Civil Practice Act and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a). 102 Section 81 of
the Civil Practice Act allowed a party to appeal a judgment and use all the
names of the parties to whom the judgment applied, for the purpose of the
appeal. In direct contrast, rule 303(a) allowed a party to appeal a judgment,
but any parties subject to the judgment who wished to join the appeal could
do so only by filing a notice of their intent to join the appeal. The conflict is
apparent because in the former case a party's name might be used for pur-
poses of the appeal without his or her consent, 103 whereas in the latter case
the only way the party's name could be used in the appeal was if he or she
expressly filed a notice to join the appeal.
In People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 104 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
a statutory appellate provision was invalid because in enacting that provision,
the General Assembly had exceeded the authority vested in it by the state
constitution. 105 Furthermore, in People v. Jackson, 106 the same court held
that where a statute and a supreme court rule, both dealing with procedure,
were in conflict, the supreme court rule predominated and the statute was
invalid. 107 However, section 81 remained on the books for years until its
repeal in 1979. 108
Repealing section 81 not only resolved the conflict with rule 303(a), but
also aligned statutory law with well-established case law regarding divisibility
of judgment. 109 Several Illinois court cases 110 have held that only' those
parties who appeal a judgment of the trial court are entitled to the benefits
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 81 (1977).
102. Id. ch. lIOA, § 303(a).
103. If a party's name was used on the appeal but that party did not wish to join in the
appeal, no costs could be taxed against him or her. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 81 (1977).
104. 40 I11. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968).
105. Id. at 66, 237 N.E.2d at 498.
106. 69 11. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977). In Jackson, the court was faced with the issue of
whether the judge or the counsel for the parties should conduct a voir dire examination of
prospective jurors in criminal cases. Section 115-4() of the Code of Criminal Procedure vested
authority to conduct the voir dire examination in the counsel for the parties, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 115-4(f) (1977), whereas Illinois Supreme Court Rules 431 and 234, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110A, §§ 234, 431 (1977), vested authority in the trial judge to conduct the examination.
See also People v. Jovicevic, 63 I11. App. 3d 106, 379 N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist. 1978) (relying on
People v. Jackson, 69 I11. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977), the court in Jovicevic reasoned that a
statute would be void if it were a legislative infringement upon the powers of the judiciary);
People v. Menken, 54 I11. App. 3d 199, 369 N.E.2d 363 (4th Dist. 1977) (when a supreme court
rule and a statute conflict, the rule must prevail if adopted through constitutional power);
People v. Brumfield, 51 111. App. 3d 637, 366 N.E.2d 1130 (3d Dist. 1977) (Illinois Constitution
provides that a supreme court rule predominates over a statute when dealing with procedure).
107. People v. Jackson, 69 IlI. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
108. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-258, 1979 I11. Laws 622.
109. P.A. 81-258 was long overdue because section 81 of the Act was in complete disaccord
with the concept of the divisibility of judgment. At common law, a judgment against two or
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of a reversal. Hence, parties who do not join in an appeal are left with the
judgment rendered by the trial court. With the repeal of section 81, the
statutory language is presently in accord with both the supreme court rules
and Illinois case law.
Insurance Code
Another important matter requiring the Commission's attention was the
conflict between section 403A and section 407 of the Illinois Insurance
Code. "' Section 403A provides that the administrative hearings conducted
pursuant to the Insurance Act were subject to the Administrative Review
Act (ARA). 112 On the other hand, section 407 of the Insurance Code set
forth specific procedural steps for judicial review that conflicted with the pro-
cedures of the ARA. There were five instances of conflict between the two
sections. First, under section 407 the first pleading was called a "peti-
tion," 113 whereas under the ARA it is called a "complaint." ' 114  Second,
under section 407 the first pleading was to be filed within 30 days from the
administrative decision. 115 In contrast, under the ARA it must be filed
within 35 days from the service of the administrative order. 116 Third,
under section 407 a certified copy of the petition had to be served upon the
Director of Insurance, 117 while under ARA no such requirement exists. 118
Fourth, section 407 required the Director of Insurance to file a transcript of
the administrative agency record within ten days after service of the peti-
tion. 119 In contrast, under the ARA, the transcript must be filed within
thirty-five days after service of the complaint. l20 Finally, section 407 al-
lowed the circuit court to hear "additional evidence," 121 but under the ARA
more plaintiffs was a unit. Therefore, in order to sue out a writ of error to reverse a judgment,
all of the judgment debtors had to join as plaintiffs in error. Section 81 was enacted in 1933 to
alleviate some of the harshness of the strict common law rule by allowing one party to an appeal
to use the names of the remaining parties. See note 103 and accompanying text supra. Although
section 81 tempered the common law rule it was not in complete harmony with section 50(6) of
the Illinois Civil Practice Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(6) (1977). Section 50(6) provides:
"[T]he fact that any order or judgment is joint does not deprive the court of power to set it
aside as to fewer than all the parties, and if so set aside it remains in full force and effect as to
the other parties." Id.
110. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 29 Ill. 2d 354, 194 N.E.2d 641 (1963); Otta v. Otta, 58 I11.
App. 2d 63, 207 N.E.2d 143 (5th Dist. 1965); Schoendienst v. Fink, 58 I11. App. 2d 203, 207
N.E.2d 325 (5th Dist. 1965).
111. Insurance Code §§ 403A, 407, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1015A, 1019 (1977).
112. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1977).
113. Id. ch. 73, § 1019(1).
114. Id. ch. 110, § 267.
115. Id. ch. 73, § 1019(1).
116. Id. ch. 110, 9 267.
117. Id. ch. 73, § 1019(1).
118. Id. ch. 110, § 269.
119. Id. ch. 73, 9 1019(1).
120. Id. ch. 110, §§ 267-270; ch. 110A § 291.
121. Id. ch. 73, § 1019(1).
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no additional evidence may be heard. 12 2  The disparity between the two
acts was heightened by the fact that twelve other statutory sections expressly
adopted the review procedure of section 407.123
At the Commission's insistence, the General Assembly eradicated the pro-
cedural confusion surrounding the Illinois Insurance Code by enacting legis-
lation 124 that authorized use of the Administrative Review Act as the means
for review of administrative orders and decisions of the Director of the De-
partment of Insurance.
Venue Act
The Commission, while continuing its efforts to resolve procedural con-
flicts, uncovered a legislative oversight concerning the old Venue Act. 125
For many years the procedural steps for obtaining a change of place of trial
in civil and criminal cases were covered by one statute. In 1963, the subject
of the change of place of a trial in criminal cases was included in section
115-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter a considerable number
of sections of the old Venue Act, which had been applicable to criminal cases
only, were repealed. However, four sections applicable only to criminal
cases were inadvertently left in the old Venue Act, which is now used for
civil cases only. To remedy this confusing situation, the statutes involved
were amended to effect the appropriate transfer of the four sections from
one statute to the other without making any change whatsoever in the sub-
stantive law. 126
Limitations Act
In 1976, the Law Revision Commission alerted the legislature to the pos-
sibly conflicting terminology in section 24 of the Limitations Act. 127 Prior
122. Id. ch. 110, § 274.
123. See id. ch. 73, §§ 640.2, 737.19a, 743.27, 744, 755, 767.63, 1013.1, 1019, 1034,
1065.18-28, 1065.50, 1065.216, (sections 767.63 and 1034 were amended by Act of Aug. 28,
1979, P.A. 81-283, 1979 I11. Laws 671); ch. 32, § 560, amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-283, 1979 I11. Laws 671.
124. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-283, 1979 II1. Laws 671. The enactment of P.A. 81-283
was also influenced to some extent by Physician's Professional Liab. Trust v. Wilcox, 53 Ill.
App. 3d 973, 369 N.E.2d 165 (1st Dist. 1977). In Physician's, the reviewing court was faced
squarely with the conflicting procedure of § 407 and the Administrative Review Act. The
Illinois Attorney General represented the appellant, the Director of Insurance, and contended
that the Administrative Review Act applied. Id. at 975, 369 N.E.2d at 168. The reviewing court
sustained the attorney general's position. Id. at 980, 369 N.E.2d at 171.
125. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 146, §§ 18-35 (1963) (amended 1979).
126. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-272, 1979 I11. Laws 644.
127. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 24a (1977) (amended 1979). The Limitations Act provides that
under certain conditions a new action may be filed within ont year after a dismissal of the first
action. This is true even though the limitation period for the filing of such an action has
elapsed. Id.
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to 1976, section 24 employed the term "non-suit" while section 52128 of the
Civil Practice Act used the term "voluntary dismissal." Section 24 was there-
after amended12 9 by deleting the words "non-suit" and incorporating the
words "voluntary dismissal."
This amendment apparently resolved the terminology conflict until some
doubts arose regarding the application of section 24 to federal actions that
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 130 Generally, federal courts had
based their decisions on the historical meaning of the term "non-suit." 131
in an effort by the Commission to remove all confusion surrounding section
24, it was amended again 132 to provide specifically that the extended one-
year period was applicable to cases where "the action is dismissed by a
United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction."'' 3 3
Administrative Review Act
Section 2 of the Administrative Review Act134 provides that the Act shall
govern judicial review of final decisions of any administrative agency that
expressly adopts the provisions of the Act. 135 All other modes of review
formerly available to agencies adopting the Act, including common law writ
of certiorari, are no longer available. Under the Act, a circuit court exercises
reviewing authority over state agencies' decisions. 136 The circuit court's au-
thority is thus somewhat analogous to the authority the appellate court exer-
cises over appeals from a circuit court. 137 Findings of fact made by the
administrative agency are held to be prima facie true, but the circuit court
otherwise has the power to consider all questions of law and fact presented
by the entire record before it. 138
In contrast to review under the Administrative Review Act, the common
law writ of certiorari is employed for the review of administrative proceed-
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 52 (1977).
129. See Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1358, 1976 II1. Laws 712.
130. See, e.g., Hupp v. Gray, 73 I11. 2d 78, 382 N.E.2d 1211 (1978) (the one-year period
within which a non-suited plaintiff may refile an action begins to run from the date of a non-suit
in the United States district court and not from the date of its affirmance on appeal).
131. A "non-suit" is an "[aIction in form of a judgment taken against a plaintiff who has failed
to appear to prosecute his action or failed to prove his case. Under rules practice, the applicable
term is dismissal .... " BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 954 (5th ed. 1979). See McColgan v. Jones,
Hubbard & Donnell, 11 Cal. 2d 243, 78 P.2d 1010 (1938).
132. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-279, 1979 I11. Laws 652. (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
133. Id. § 1.
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1977).
135. Id. § 265.
136. Id. § 274.
137. See, e.g., Adamek v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 17 I11. App. 2d 11, 149 N.E.2d 466 (1st Dist.
1958) (though similar, review powers are statutory, not of general appellate jurisdiction).
138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 274 (1977). See also Sye v. Wood Dale Fire Protection Dist.
No. 1, 43 Ill. App. 3d 48, 356 N.E.2d 938 (2d Dist. 1976) (parties brought before an administra-
tive agency are entitled to have that body base its decision on evidence received at the hear-
ing).
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ings where no statutory provision is available for judicial review. 139 Gener-
ally, judicial review of decisions of municipal administrative bodies acting by
virtue of a municipal ordinance and of other administrative decisions not
expressly reviewable by statute were reviewable by common law certiorari.
Unfortunately, review under common law certiorari provided only a limited
remedy, and the powers of the reviewing court were curtailed. The only
judgment the court had authority to render was (a) that the petition be dis-
missed and the writ of certiorari quashed (which was a judgment in favor of
the defendant) or (b) that the record of proceedings be quashed (which was a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff). 140 The court had no authority to remand
the matter to the administrative agency, or to enter an order quashing the
writ or record in part. 141
On the other hand, review under the ARA provides a more flexible rem-
edy. The reviewing circuit court may require a bond to be posted, stay the
agency decision pending final disposition of the case, affirm or reverse the
decision in whole or in part, remand the decision in whole or in part, re-
mand the case for the purpose of taking additional evidence, or enter a
money judgment in favor of the successful party. 142  From the above enu-
meration of powers, it is clear that judicial review under the ARA is a superior
remedy to judicial review by the historical form of common law certiorari.
It should be noted that recent Illinois decisions have, for all practical pur-
poses, abolished the rigid distinctions that formerly existed between review
under common law certiorari and under the ARA. 143 In a proceeding
pursuant to a writ of certiorari today, the reviewing court performs substan-
tially the same functions as the reviewing court does under the ARA. 144 Not-
139. See Smith v. Department of Pub. Aid, 67 II. 2d 529, 367 N.E.2d 1286 (1977) (common
law writ of certiorari is a general means of reviewing administrative decisions that are not re-
viewable under any statute); Bartunek v. Lastovken, 350 Ill. 380, 183 N.E. 333 (1932) (jurisdic-
tion to issue common law writ of certiorari not limited to property right); Quinlin & Tyson, Inc.
v. City of Evanston, 25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 324 N.E.2d 65 (1st Dist. 1975) (certiorari has remained
the appropriate method of review of municipal administrative agency decisions where the Ad-
ministrative Review Act is not in effect).
140. See People v. Fisher, 373 I1. 228, 230, 25 N.E.2d 785, 788 (1940) (in actions based on
common law certiorari the court may only quash the proceedings or quash the writ and dismiss
the petition); People v. Lindblom, 182 II. 241, 244-45, 55 N.E. 358, 359-60 (1899) (review
under common law certiorari is not general appellate jurisdiction).
141. See Hoffman v. Department of Fin., 374 Il1. 494, 30 N.E.2d 34 (1940) (court is without
authority to quash writ in part and enter judgment fixing amount of tax); People v. Fisher, 373
I1. 228, 25 N.E.2d 785 (1940) (court may only quash writ, or quash return, since statute makes
provision for no other order).
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 275 (1977).
143. See Homefinders, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 65 II. 2d 115, 357 N.E.2d 785 (1966) (sub-
stantial differences that at one time existed between common law and statutory certiorari have
been all but obliterated); S & F Corp. v. Daley, 59 IIl. App. 3d 1024, 376 N.E.2d 699 (1st Dist.
1978) (the differences between common law and statutory certiorari are no longer apparent).
144. See Smith v. Department of Pub. Aid, 67 Ill. 2d 529, 367 N.E.2d 1286 (1977) (the
extent of review tinder common law certiorari conforms to review under the Administrative
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withstanding the similarities between the forms of review, the Commission's
desire to bring about uniformity of review of administrative decisions
14 5
prompted the Commission actively to encourage the adoption of the Ad-
ministrative Review Act by various state agencies, and the legislature has
complied in part with the recommendations of the Commission. 146
judicial Notice Act
The scope of the Judicial Notice Act 147 was broadened through the efforts
of the Law Review Commission. Before 1979, the Illinois courts were em-
powered to take judicial notice of matters of public record, 148 and of the
laws of foreign jurisdictions. 149 Peculiarly, however, the various circuit
Review Act); S & F Corp. v. Bilandic, 62 Ill. App. 3d 193, 378 N.E.2d 1137 (1st Dist. 1978)
(the standard of review is similar for cases brought under the Act or under common law cer-
tiorari). In Penrod v. Dept. of Corrections, 72 11. App. 3d 649, 651, 391 N.E.2d 59, 61 (1979),
the court said: "Defendants contend the trial court erred by not applying the principles of
common law certiorari which they allege is more limited in scope than statutory administrative
review. We cannot agree. The Illinois Supreme Court has established that there is no longer a
viable difference between these two types of proceedings. In Smith v. Department of Public
Aid, 67 I11. 2d 529, 541, 367 N.E.2d 1286, 1293 (1977) [citations omitted], the court stated:
"This court has recently held that the substantial differences that at one time existed between
commom law and statutory certiorari have been all but obliterated.' "
The fashioning of a new remedy is not a novel experience for the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Thus, in People v. Davis, 54 I11. 2d 494, 298 N.E.2d 161 (1973), the supreme court held that
although the Post-Conviction Hearing Act expressly limits its application to convicts "impris-
oned in the penitentiary" (i.e., convicted of felonies) who claim denial of a substantial constitu-
tional right [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1977)], "this court has fashioned a remedy for a
defendant convicted of a misdemeanor who asserts that there was a substantial denial of his
constitutional rights." 54 Ill. 2d at 497, 298 N.E.2d at 163. Accord, People v. Warr, 54 I11. 2d
487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973).
145. See generally Fins, Need for Uniformity in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions,
61 ILL. B.J. 366 (1973).
146. Act of Aug. 20, 1979, P.A. 81-211, 1979 I11. Laws 377, and Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-265, 1979 I11. Laws 632, provide for the adoption of the Administrative Review Act by nine
additional public agencies. For example, Park Commission rulings, orders of the Department of
Agriculture, and review under the Business Corporation Act are now reviewable under the
Administrative Review Act.
147. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 48a-48b (1977) (as amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-285, 1979 I11. Laws 678).
148. See Nordine v. Illinois Power Co., 32 I11. 2d 421, 206 N.E.2d 709 (1965) (court will take
judicial notice of documents that are a matter of public record); People v. Middleton, 43 III.
App. 3d 1030, 357 N.E.2d 1238 (1st Dist. 1976) (court will take judicial notice of every domestic
corporation and every foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state); People v. Mitch-
ell, 35 I11. App. 3(1 151, 341 N.E.2d 153 (1st Dist. 1975) (document involved a matter of public
record and the court will take judicial notice). Also, the Illinois statutes give a broad definition
to the term "public record." See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.103 (1977).
149. The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 4 8g (1977),
provides that "[e]very court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law & statutes
of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States." Id. § 1.
By virtue of the above statute, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Moscov v. Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 387 IIl. 378, 56 N.E.2d 399 (1944), took judicial notice of the common law of
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courts in Illinois did not have the power to take judicial notice of the ordi-
nances of all municipalities and counties within the state. 150 For example,
the Circuit Court for DuPage County, the eighteenth circuit court, could
take judicial notice only of ordinances promulgated in DuPage County. The
Circuit Court for the Second Circuit, which encompasses twelve counties,
however, could judicially notice the ordinances in all twelve counties.' 5 '
Another senseless distinction existed when a case was transferred from one
circuit to another. For instance, if a case involving an ordinance of a munici-
pality located in DuPage County was filed in the Circuit Court for Sangamon
County, that court could not take judicial notice of that ordinance. If the
case were originally filed in DuPage County, however, and was then trans-
ferred, by change of venue, to Sangamon County, the Sangamon Circuit
Court could judicially notice the DuPage County ordinance.
There is no reason why Illinois circuit courts should not take judicial
notice of the ordinances of every Illinois governmental unit. This is especially
true now that home rule under the state constitution elevates many local
ordinances to a status comparable to state statutes. 152 At the Commission's
urging, the appropriate statute was amended to provide for liberal judicial
notice provisions. As a result, Illinois courts may now take judicial notice of
all municipal and county ordinances anywhere in the State. 153
Application of the Civil Practice Act and
Supreme Court Rules to Other Acts
Prior to the Law Revision Commission's creation, the Illinois Legislature
did not have a uniform method of incorporating the contents of the Civil
Practice Act and the Supreme Court Rules into other acts. In 1979 the
Pennsylvania. In Hyatt v. Cox, 57 I11. App. 2d 293, 206 N.E.2d 260 (4th Dist. 1965), the court
said: "The trial court and this court are required by statute to take judicial notice of the case law
of our sister states [citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 48(b), 48(g) (1961)]."
150. In contrast to the above statutes and cases was § 1 of the Judicial Notice Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 51, § 48(a) (1977), which provided that:
Every court of original jurisdiction .. .shall take judicial notice of the following:
Second, [aill ordinances of every county within the judicial circuit or other terri-
tory for which such court has been established, or within the judicial circuit from
which a case has been brought to such court by a change of venue or otherwise.
Id. § 48a(1). See Fins, Judicial Notice-The Illinois Anomaly, 7 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 15.
151. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 72.1 (1977) (amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-285, 1979 I11. Laws 678).
152. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1970).
153. The Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-285, 1979 I11. Laws 678, provides that Illinois circuit
courts shall take judicial notice of "First: All general ordinances of every municipal corporation
within the State. Second: All ordinances of every county within the State." It should be noted
that this needed change was also urged by the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court in his
1979 Annual Report to the Illinois General Assembly. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 9 Judicial Ad-
ministration Newsletter No. 9 (March 1979).
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Commission took steps to remedy this technical problem, and the result was
the amendment of twenty-seven acts 154 to provide a uniform system of in-
corporation. The form employed in these amendments states that: "It]he
provisions of the Civil Practice Act, and all existing and future amendments
of such Act and modifications thereof, and the Supreme Court Rules now or
hereafter adopted in relation to that Act, shall apply to all proceedings
hereunder, except as otherwise provided in this Act."' 5 5 With the use of this
provision the legislature has remedied the total lack of uniformity previously
encountered in legislative materials.
Seeking Wrong Remedy Not Fatal
In 1973, the Illinois Legislature amended eight statutes 156 covering pro-
ceedings involving Attachment, Attachment of Water Craft, Habeas Corpus,
Injunction, Mandamus, Ne Exeat, Quo Warranto, and Replevin. To each
amended act a section was added that allowed plaintiffs, who were entitled
to relief, to amend their pleadings if they inadvertently requested the wrong
remedy. 157 Additionally, if the plaintiff did amend the pleadings the
defendant was entitled to assert additional defenses. 158 However, this sec-
tion applied only to the statutes mentioned above and was not incorporated
generally into the Civil Practice Act. This oversight led to harsh results in
several judicial decisions. For example, in People v. Freeman, 159 a petition
was filed under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act. The appropriate remedy
in that case was habeas corpus. The trial court dismissed the petition, and
the appellate court affirmed, because there was no provision for amending
pleadings in a section 72 proceeding or in the Civil Practice Act generally.
The Commission urged that a provision be added to the Civil Practice Act
that would permit liberality in amendment of pleadings in all proceedings
154. Act of Sept. 14, 1979, P.A. 81-661, 1979 Ill. Laws 1466.
155. Id. § 26.
156. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 44; id. ch. 12, § 47; id. ch. 65, § 36.1; id. ch. 69, § 24; id.
ch. 87, § 12; id. ch. 97, § 13; id. ch. 112, § 17; id. ch. 119, § 28 (1973). See Schallau v. City of
Northlake, - Ill. App. 3d -, 403 N.E.2d 266 (1st Dist. 1979); Pierson v. Bloodworth, __
I11. App. 3d -, 401 N.E.2d 1320 (5th Dist. 1980).
157. The amended sections as they appear in the statutes listed in note 150 supra state that:
Where relief is sought under this Act and the Court determines, on motion di-
rected to the pleadings, or on motion for summary judgment or upon trial, that the
plaintiff has pleaded or established facts which entitle him to relief but that he has
sought the wrong remedy, the Court shall permit the pleadings to be amended, on
just and reasonable terms, and the Court shall grant the relief to which plaintiff is
entitled on the amended pleadings or upon the evidence. In considering whether a
proposed amendment is just and reasonable, the Court shall consider the right of
the defendant to assert additional defenses, to demand a trial by jury, to plead a
counter-claim or third party complaint, and to order the plaintiff to take additional
steps which were not required under the pleadings as previously filed.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 44; id. ch. 12, § 47; id. ch. 65, § 36.1; id. ch. 69, § 24; id. ch. 87, §
12; id. ch. 97, § 13; id. ch. 112, § 17; id. ch. 119, § 28 (1973).
158. See note 157 supra.
159. 26 I11. App. 3d 443, 326 N.E.2d 207 (1st Dist. 1974).
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governed by the Civil Practice Act. The legislature complied, and con-
sequently section 46.1160 was added to the Civil Practice Act in 1979.161
COORDINATION OF STATUTES WITH NEW LEGISLATION
AND SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
In its role as coordinator of the Illinois statutes with new legislation, the
Commission effectuated the amendment 62 of all statutes referring to the old
Divorce Act. 163 The Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 164 effective
October 1, 1977, introduced new terminology governing Illinois domestic
relations law. For example, "dissolution of marriage" replaced the former
"divorce," "declaration of invalidity of marriage" replaced "annulment," and
"legal separation" was substituted for "separate maintenance." Nineteen acts
were amended to coordinate all Illinois statutes with the terminology of the
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.
Gender-Biased Tenninology
In a continuation 16 5 of its efforts to eliminate gender bias from the Illinois
Revised Statutes, the Law Revision Commission along with the Commission
on the Status of Women, brought about the elimination of gender bias in
employment through the amendment of fifteen acts. 166 Gender-biased ter-
minology relating to real property ownership and disposition was also elimi-
nated, through the amendment of three acts. 167
Paternity Act
Under the Paternity Act, 16 8 a paternity action must be filed within two
years following the birth of a child out of wedlock. 169 The Act provides that
the statutory two year filing period tolls if the alleged putative father is
located outside of the state. There was no provision in the Act, however, to
toll the filing period if the alleged putative father was concealed within the
160. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-271, 1979 I11. Laws 643. Since § 46 of the Civil
Practice Act deals with amendments, the addition of P.A. 81-271 was inserted in the Civil
Practice Act as § 46.1. The text of § 46.1 is identical to that reproduced in note 157 su pra.
161. Section 46.1 currently applies to all civil proceedings because numerous statutes incor-
porate the Civil Practice Act by reference.
162. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-230, 1979 I11. Laws 552.
163. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40 (1975).
164. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 301, 401, 402 (1977).
165. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
166. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-257, 1979 I11. Laws 614.
167. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-266, 1979 Ill. Laws 633.
168. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1351-1368 (1977).
169. Id. § 1354.
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state. At the Commission's urging, the Paternity Act was amended1 70 to
remedy this situation so that the filing period now tolls not only when the
alleged putative father is out of state, but also when he is concealed within
the state.
Probate Act
Very often in a complex statutory system, the legislature amends statutes
and inadvertently affects numerous other statutes. For example, a number of
acts had been closely tied with the provisions of the Probate Act of 1939.171
When the legislature provided an entirely new section plan in 1975 for the
Probate Act, 172 some acts that were not amended failed to conform with
the new provisions. To render the statutes involved meaningful, the Com-
mission submitted amendments 1 73 to coordinate with the respective sections
of the Probate Act of 1975, and these amendments were enacted into law.
The Illinois Court System
Another major concern of the Law Revision Commission was the presence of
outmoded terminology employed throughout the Illinois court system. The
Commission pointed out that writs of procedendo, error, and supersedeas
were still present in the Supreme Court Act. 174 However, the purpose and
use of these writs had long since lapsed into obsolescence. Consequently,
upon the Commission's recommendation, the legislature amended the
Supreme Court Act 175 to delete references to these outmoded phrases.
Prior to 1964, the Illinois Appellate Court owed its composition and
status to statutory law. 176 As a result of the Judicial Article of
1962, 177 however, the composition of the appellate court system was com-
pletely changed. 17 Through the Commission's efforts, the Appellate Court
170. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-233, 1979 I11. Laws 569.
171. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 151-501 (1939).
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 1-1 (1975).
173. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-264, 1979 II1. Laws 630.
174. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 (1977).
175. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-275, 1979 IIl. Laws 649.
176. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (1870). "Appellate courts shall be held by such number of
judges of the circuit courts, and at such times and places and in such manner as may be
provided by law." Id.
177. ILL. CONsT. art. VI (1962).
178. Under the Judicial Article of 1962 and the 1970 Constitution, the organization of the
Appellate Court is as follows:
1. There is one Appellate Court in the State with five branches, each covering a
judicial district. Each judicial district must have not less than three judges.
2. The Appellate Court consisted in 1964 of a total of twenty-four judges, twelve
of whom were from Cook County, and three from each of the four downstate judi-
cial districts. However, these numbers are subject to change by law.
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Act of 1877 was remodeled 179 to reflect accurately the tribunal's current
status as a constitutional court.
On December 31, 1963, the Superior Court of Cook County ceased to
exist, yet reference to it remained in four acts until 1979. At the Commis-
sion's request, these obsolete references were deleted. 180 Similarly, mas-
ters in chancery had been abolished, yet a reference to them remained in
one act until 1979. This reference was also removed, thereby conforming the
statutory language with the realities now prevailing in the Illinois legal sys-
tem. 181
The Commission discovered additional conflicts that existed in the court
system. First, one act was repealed 182 that dealt with motion practice in the
supreme court, a subject fully covered in Supreme Court Rule 361. 183 Sec-
ond, the Commission was responsible for the removal of an obsolete provi-
sion that required the filing of a praecipe to obtain a fee bill from a clerk of
the court.184 Finally, because section 18 of article VI of the Illinois Con-
stitution 185 provides that the clerk of the supreme court is appointed, not
elected, an outdated statutory reference to election was deleted. 18 6
Supreme Court Decisions
In addition to revising the terminology of various statutes, the Law Revi-
sion Commission harmonized certain acts with Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sions. In People v. Jackson, 187 the Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a provision of the criminal code that involved trial attorneys' rights
to question jurors on voir dire. The court held that a conflicting Supreme
Court Rule took precedence over the statute, because the Illinois Constitu-
tion vested administrative power in the supreme court to promulgate rules
governing trial and appellate procedure. The Commission brought this mat-
3. The judges of the Appellate Court are elected as judges of this Court and not,
as theretofore, assigned from among the judges of the Circuit Courts and the judges
of the Superior Court of Cook County.
4. There are in each district such number of divisions as the Supreme Court
prescribes. Each division must have not less than three judges.
5. Each branch or division sits at times and places prescribed by rules of the
Supreme Court.
6. The majority of a division constitutes a quorum and the concurrence of a
majority of the division is necessary to a decision of the Appellate Court.
H. FINS, ILLINOIS APPELLATE PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION 140-41 (2d ed.
1977).
179. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-260, 1979 I11. Laws 623.
180. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-282, 1979 II1. Laws 666.
181. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-259, 1979 II1. Laws 622.
182. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-278, 1979 Ill. Laws 651.
183. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 361 (1977).
184. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-277, 1979 I11. Laws 651.
185. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (1970).
186. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-276, 1979 II1. Laws 650.
187. 69 III. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
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ter to the legislature's attention, and the Act was amended to conform with
the supreme court's ruling. 1l
Two other acts were amended, in a similar fashion, to conform to the
supreme court decisions of People v. Briceland'8 9 and Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of America v. Slattery. 190 A provision of section 4 of the Environmen-
tal Protection Act' 9 ' was held unconstitutional in Briceland because it per-
mitted the Environmental Protection Agency to prosecute cases before the
Pollution Control Board. 192 The court held that, subject to the provision of
article V, section 15, of the Illinois Constitution, 193 the attorney general was
the only officer authorized to institute and prosecute proceedings before the
Pollution Control Board. 194 Accordingly, section 4 of the Environmental
Protection Act was amended1 95 to comply with the Briceland court's deci-
sion.
Finally, section 76 of "[a]n Act concerning public utilities"' 1 9 6 was
amended to avoid a possible constitutional challenge. Before the amend-
ment, a portion of the Public Utilities Act could have been interpreted so as
to permit the Illinois Commerce Commission to impose cumulative penalties
on public utilities found to be in violation of the Commission's order before
the utility had a chance to seek review of the order. 197 Section 76 therefore
was amended to provide a thirty-day period during which a public utility
convicted of a violation may seek review of the order before penalties are
imposed. 198
1976-1979 MODERNIZATION OF LEGAL TERMINOLOGY
One of the aims of the Illinois Law Revision Commission is to present
Illinois statutes in "the language of the people" instead of employing an-
tiquated "Latin" and "Norman-French" terms. The objective is to make the
Illinois statutes understandable by non-lawyers as well as lawyers. Towards
this goal, the deletion of the following anachronisms has been accomplished:
188. See Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-263, 1979 Il1. Laws 628.
189. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
190. 302 U.S. 300 (1937).
191. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1004(e) (1977).
192. 65 I11. 2d at 501-02, 359 N.E.2d at 157.
193. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 15 (1970).
194. 65 I11. 2d at 500-01, 359 N.E.2d at 156-57.
195. Act of Aug. 23, 1979, P.A. 81-219, 1979 I11. Laws 484.
196. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 76 (1977).
197. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937). The Court stated: "'[A]ny
application of the statute subjecting the appellant to the risk of the cumulative penalties pend-
ing an attempt to test the validity of the order in the courts for a reasonable time after the
decision would be a denial of due process." Id. at 310.
198. See Act of Aug 23, 1979, P.A. 81-219, 1979 I11. Laws 484.
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riens per descent 199
A plea by an heir sued for the debt of his ancestor that he had no lands by
descent from the ancestor. 200
demurrer201
An allegation that, admitting the facts of the preceding pleading to be
true, as stated by the party making it, the party has yet shown no cause why
the party demurring should be compelled by the court to proceed further. 20 2
nihil dicit 203
The name of the judgment rendered against a defendant who fails to put
in a plea or answer to the plaintiff's declaration by the day assigned. In such
a case, judgment is given against the defendant of course, as he or she says
nothing to show why it should not.2 0 4
nil dicit 20 5
This has the same meaning as "nihil dicit" because "nil" is a contracted
form of "nihil." 20 6
jeofails 207
I have failed; I am in error. Certain statutes are called statutes of amend-
ments and jeofails, because where a pleader perceives any slip in the form of
the proceedings and acknowledges the error (jeofaile), he or she is at liberty,
by those statutes, to amend it.2 0 8
seizin 209
The completion of the feudal investiture, by which the tenant was admit-
ted into the feud and performed the rights of homage and fealty. Seizin is a
technical term to denote the completion of that investiture, by which the
tenant was admitted into the tenure, and without which no freehold could
be constituted or pass.2 10
feoffor 2 1 1
Feoffment is a gift of a freehold interest in land accompanied by livery of
seizin. In medieval days it was the normal mode of transferring a freehold
interest in land of free tenure. The essential part is the livery of seizin. The
feoffor is the person who makes the feoffment. 212
199. Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1365, § 27, 1976 I11. Laws 1034.
200. BouvIER's LAW DICTIONARY 2960 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
201. Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1365, § 27, 1976 Ill. Laws 1034.
202. BoUVIER's LAw DICTIONARY 837 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
203. Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1365, § 27, 1976 I11. Laws 1034.
204. BouviER's LAw DICTIONARY 2830 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
205. Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1358, § 24, 1976 111. Laws 713.
206. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 942 (5th ed. 1979).
207. Act of Sept. 16, 1977, P.A. 80-742, 1977 II1. Laws 2211.
208. BouvIER's LAw DICTIONARY 1690 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
209. Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A. 80-660, 1977 II1. Laws 2003.
210. BouvIER's LAw DICTIONARY 3036 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
211. Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A. 80-660, 1977 I11. Laws 2003.
212. BouvIER's LAw DICTIONARY 1206 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
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feoffee 213
The person to whom a fee is conveyed. 214
praecipe 215
A written order to the clerk of the court to issue a writ. 216
scire facias 217
The name of a writ (and of the whole proceeding) founded on some public
record.
A judicial writ at common law to revive judgment or to obtain satisfaction
thereof from sureties upon bail or other recognizances taken in the proceed-
ings in which the judgment is rendered. 218
venditio re exponas 219
The name of a writ of execution, directed to the sheriff, commanding the
sheriff to sell goods or chattels, and in some states, lands, which have been
taken in execution by virtue of a fieri facias, and which remain unsold. 22 0
vendue 221
A sale: generally a sale at public auction; and more particularly a sale so
made under the authority of law, as by a constable, sheriff, tax collector,
administrator, etc. 222
mittimus 223
"A mittimus is only a transcript of the minutes of the conviction and sen-
tence duly certified by the clerk. The clerk can only certify to the order of
the court and the sheriff can only execute the sentence of the court as re-
corded." 224
supersedeas 225
An auxiliary process designed to supersede the enforcement of the judg-
ment of the court below, brought up by writ of error for review. 226
213. Act of Sept. 14, 1977, P.A. 80-660, 1977 Ill. Laws 2003.
214. BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 1206 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
215. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-277, 1979 Ill. Laws 679.
216. BoUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 2650 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
217. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-268, 1979 I11. Laws 641; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-286, 1979 I11. Laws 679.
218. BouvIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 3014 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
219. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-281, 1979 Ill. Laws 659.
220. BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 3389 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
221. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-231, 1979 111. Laws 563; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-281, 1979 Ill. Laws 659.
222. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1395 (5th ed. 1979).
223. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-238, 1979 Ill. Laws 581.
224. People v. Graydon, 329 I11. 398, 401, 160 N.E. 748, 750 (1928). United States v. De-
nemark, 138 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1943). See also BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 2234 (F.
Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
225. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-260, 1979 I11. Laws 623; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-275, 1979 Ill. Laws 649; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-281, 1979 I11. Laws 653.
226. Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248 (1880). See also BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 3186 (F.
Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
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procedendo 227
A procedendo operates in the same manner as the mandate or remanding
order of a court of review. 228
precept 229
A writ directed to the sheriff, or other officer, commanding some official
duty. 230
capias 231
A writ directing the sheriff to take the person of the defendant into cus-
tody. 232
capias ad satisfaciendum 233
A writ directed to the sheriff or coroner, commanding these officers to
take and confine the person therein named and keep him or her safely so
that the named party may be present in court on the return day of the writ,
to satisfy (ad satisfaciendum) the party who has recovered judgment. 234
nonsuit 235
The name of a judgment given against a plaintiff who is unable to prove a
case, or refuses or neglects to proceed to the trial of a cause after it has been
put at issue, without determining such issue. 236
demandant 237
The plaintiff or party who brings a real action. A "real action" was, at
common law, one brought for the specific recovery of lands, tenements, or
hereditaments. 238
writ of error 239
A writ issued from a court of appellate jurisdiction, directed to the judge
or judges of a court of record, requiring them to remit to the appellate court
the record of an action before them, in which a final judgment has been
entered, in order that examination may be made of certain errors alleged to
have been committed, and that the judgment may be reversed, corrected, or
affirmed, as the case may require. 240
227. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-275, 1979 I11. Laws 649.
228. McCord v. Briggs & Turivas, 338 I11. 158, 168, 170 N.E. 320, 329 (1930). See also
BoUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 2729 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
229. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-254, 1979 I11. Laws 612.
230. BoUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 2660 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
231. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-284, 1979 II1. Laws 678.
232. BouvIER's LAw DICTIONARY 415 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
233. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-235, 1979 Ill. Laws 573.
234. BouvIER's LAw DICTIONARY 419 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
235. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-231, 1979 I11. Laws 563.
236. BouvIER's LAW DICTIONARY 2360 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
237. Act of Aug. 6, 1976, P.A. 79-1365, 1976 Ill. Laws 1034.
238. BoUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 833, 2813 (F. Rawle 3d rev. ed. 1914).
239. Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81-260, 1979 I11. Laws 623; Act of Aug. 28, 1979, P.A.
81-275, 1979 Ill. Laws 649.
240. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1143-44 (5th ed. 1979).
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THE TASK AHEAD
The Law Revision Commission has, during its existence, accomplished
many of its intermediary goals, but there is more work yet to be done. This
remains the Commission's task for the immediate future. There is now a
movement afoot for the enactment of a Code of Civil Procedure in Il-
linois. 241 The members of the legislature, the bench, and the bar have
responded to the project with great enthusiasm. It is of interest to observe
that although Illinois has had a Code of Criminal Procedure since 1963,242
this state does not have, seventeen years later, a Code of Civil Procedure.
Such a code would be a valuable and convenient legal tool for the lawyer
and layman alike. It would greatly reduce the number of chapters in the
voluminous statute books and would eliminate many overlapping statutory
provisions that now exist. The Act that created the Illinois Law Revision
Commission specifically states that one of its objectives is to reduce the
"three inordinately thick volumes of text" 243 of the revised statutes. The
Commission is therefore participating actively in the sponsorship of a Code
of the Civil Procedure for the State of Illinois. On March 28, 1980, the
Chairman of the Commission, joined by members of the Commission and
others, introduced in the Illinois House of Representatives H.B. 3262 for the
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Commission has proven its
value 244 and its continued active participation is imperative for the much-
needed progress in the coordination and modernization of Illinois law.
241. Fins, Code of Civil Procedure for Illinois, 68 ILL. B.J. 312 (1980).
242. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 100-1 to -1105 (1977).
243. Act of Aug. 29, 1975, P.A. 79-662, preamble 1975 11. Laws 2076 (repealed 1977).
244. In 1975, the legislature assigned to the Commission a life span of two years. Act of Aug.
29, 1975, P.A. 79-662, 1975 Ill. Laws 2076. In 1977, the Commission's duration was extended
for another two years. Act of Sept. 18, 1977, P.A. 86-789, 1977 III. Laws 2327. Act of Sept. 21,
1979, P.A. 81-855, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 1906, extended the Commission's duration to De-
cember 31, 1981.
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